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This paper tests for purchasing power parity (PPP) using real effective exchange
rate data for 90 developed and developing countries in the post–Bretton Woods
period. Support for PPP is found, since the majority of countries experience finite
deviations of real exchange rates from parity. The speed of parity reversion is
found to be typically much faster for developed countries than for developing coun-
tries and to be considerably faster for countries with flexible nominal exchange
rate regimes compared with countries having fixed nominal exchange rate regimes.
[JEL C22, F31, F41]
E
xchange rates have been at the center of policy and academic debates in devel-
oping and developed countries, especially since the floating of developed-
country exchange rates in the early 1970s, which marked the commencement of the
post–Bretton Woods period. Despite these debates, several key empirical questions
regarding the stylized facts of exchange rates remain largely unresolved, particularly
in the little-researched area of real exchange rate behavior in developing countries
(Edwards and Savastano, 2000). Several of these exchange rate–related questions are
tackled in this paper: Do real exchange rates really display parity-reverting behavior?
Is purchasing power parity (PPP) an appropriate (very) long-run benchmark for
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assessing real exchange rate developments? Does the behavior of real exchange
rates differ among developed and developing countries? Are there important dif-
ferences in the extent of parity reversion when comparing countries with fixed
nominal exchange rate regimes and those with flexible nominal exchange rate
regimes? Can we explain cross-country heterogeneity of parity reversion using
countries’ structural characteristics, and, if so, which characteristics appear to be
important? In this study we examine the empirical support for PPP through time-
series analysis of the persistence of shocks to the real effective exchange rates of
90 developed and developing countries in the post–Bretton Woods period.
The theory of PPP, in its most rudimentary form, states that there is an equi-
librium level to which exchange rates converge, so that foreign currencies should
have the same purchasing power.1 Therefore, long-run PPP is inconsistent with a
unit root in real exchange rates. The reason for this is that a shock to a unit root
process will have permanent effects on all future values of the series, potentially
without bound.2 Unfortunately, formal statistical tests that compare the unit root
(UR) model against the alternative of a stationary autoregressive (AR) model typ-
ically lead to a failure to reject the hypothesis of a unit root.
There are a number of econometric problems with using the UR/AR model to
test for PPP. First, least squares estimators of AR models bias empirical results in
favor of finding PPP. This downward bias becomes particularly acute when the AR
parameter is close to unity. As lower values of the AR parameter imply faster speeds
of adjustment following a shock, this will also result in a downward bias to estimates
of half-lives of shocks. This near unit root bias is likely to be particularly relevant
for real exchange rates, as they are often found to be stationary yet exhibit shocks
that are highly persistent. Second, unit root tests tend to be uninformative regarding
the speed of parity reversion, because a rejection of the unit root null could still be
consistent with a stationary model of real exchange rates that has highly persistent
shocks. This leads to problems about how to interpret results and often yields arbi-
trary conclusions that are dependent on the predisposition of the researcher.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it reports median-
unbiased estimates of the half-lives of real exchange rate adjustment for 90 devel-
oped and developing countries over the post–Bretton Woods period. To the best of
our knowledge, this study is the first to apply median-unbiased estimation methods
to developing-country real exchange rate data.3 Second, we use Andrews’ (1993)
unbiased model-selection rule to draw conclusions as to the presence (or absence)
of parity reversion of real exchange rates in the post–Bretton Woods period. In par-
ticular, finite half-lives constructed from bias-corrected estimation indicate that
1Since the present study of PPP employs data on price indices rather than price levels, we are examin-
ing the relevance of relative PPP: the notion that the percentage change in the nominal effective exchange
rate should compensate for the inflation differential between the home country and a weighted average of
partner countries. This test of relative PPP is more stringent than the usual test, which uses first differences
of the real exchange rate.
2For surveys on PPP and exchange rate economics, see Froot and Rogoff (1995), Sarno and Taylor
(2002), and Taylor (2003).
3Recent work on testing PPP and the stationarity of real exchange rates in developing countries includes
Bahmani-Oskooee (1995) and Montiel (1997), among others; studies concentrating on Latin American
countries include Devereux and Connolly (1996) and Calvo, Reinhart, and Végh (1995).PARITY REVERSION IN REAL EXCHANGE RATES: FAST,SLOW,OR NOT AT ALL?
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real exchange rate shocks are mean-reverting. Third, we break down the half-lives
estimated by geographic region, income level, dominant exportable, and exchange
rate regime. Fourth, we attempt to explain the heterogeneity in the duration of par-
ity reversion by examining bivariate correlations between estimated half-lives and
potential nominal factors (inflation and choice of nominal exchange rate regime)
and potential real factors (trade openness, productivity growth, and government
spending). Finally, this study extends Cashin and McDermott (2003) by covering
a larger sample of country real exchange rates for the post–Bretton Woods period,
and attempting to explain the factors driving the observed heterogeneity of the
duration of exchange rate deviations from parity.
We have several key findings. First, using post–Bretton Woods data on the real
effective exchange rates of 90 industrial and developing countries and least squares
estimation of unit root models, we replicate Rogoff’s (1996) consensus estimate
of the half-life of deviations from PPP of three to five years. Second, using median-
unbiased estimates, we find that for 40 countries in our sample, deviations of the
real exchange rate from parity are best viewed as being permanent. However, the
majority (50) of the countries have finite half-life estimates—this evidence of real
exchange rate reversion to parity is consistent with PPP holding in the post–Bretton
Woods period. Third, the median half-life of parity deviations for industrial coun-
tries (eight years) is much shorter than that for developing countries (permanent).
Fourth, the median half-life of parity deviation for countries with fixed nominal
exchange rate regimes (permanent) is considerably longer than that for countries
with flexible nominal exchange rate regimes (six years). Fifth, two key structural
characteristics that affect the persistence of shocks to real exchange rates are dif-
ferences in a country’s inflation experience and the extent of nominal exchange rate
volatility. Finally, the existing literature on measuring parity reversion in develop-
ing countries has largely concentrated on the Latin America experience (which is
dominated by high-inflation countries). This sample-selection bias has resulted in
the erroneous finding that parity reversion in developing countries is faster than that
observed in developed countries.
I. Measures of Speed of Parity Reversion
The presence of unit roots in real exchange rates is incompatible with long-run PPP.
Consequently, unit root tests that focus on whether shocks are mean-reverting or
not have been widely used to test for long-run PPP. However, it is preferable to use
measures of the speed of reversion in evaluating PPP, because a very persistent
real exchange rate can still be incompatible with how PPP is interpreted in theo-
ries of exchange rate determination. Conversely, failure to reject a unit root test
may occur as a result of the well-known low power properties of unit root tests,
when in fact PPP may hold in longer-term data. As a consequence, recent papers
examining the persistence of exchange rate shocks in the post–Bretton Woods
period have used estimates of the half-life of parity deviations (Andrews, 1993;
Andrews and Chen, 1994; and Cheung and Lai, 2000b).4
4Biased and bias-corrected point estimates of the half-life of shocks to economic time series have
also been used by Cashin, Liang, and McDermott (2000) in modeling the persistence of shocks to world Paul Cashin and C.John McDermott
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We use the AR(p) model to measure the degree of persistence in real exchange
rates. The AR(p) model (also known as an Augmented Dickey-Fuller, or ADF,
regression) takes the form
where the observed real exchange rate series is qt: t =− p, ...,   T, µ the intercept,
α the autoregressive parameter (where α∈(−1,1]), and εt are the innovations of the
model. The lagged first differences are included to control for the presence of serial
correlation. The α parameter in equation (1) can be corrected for the downward
bias present in such regression by using the methods suggested by Andrews and
Chen (1994).5 The bias correction delivers an impartiality property to the decision-
making process, because there is an equal chance of under- or overestimating the
AR parameter. Moreover, an unbiased estimate of α will allow us to calculate an
unbiased scalar estimate of persistence—the half-life of a unit shock.
Model Selection Rule
Testing the PPP proposition is a controversial subject that has not yet been resolved.
Most modern time-series tests of PPP are based on testing whether α <1 in AR
models of the real exchange rate, as in equation (1). Unit root tests based on clas-
sical hypothesis tests tend to have a null hypothesis where PPP does not hold—
that is, the null hypothesis is that PPP deviations are permanent. Further, because
of the low power properties of these tests (at least against reasonable alternatives),
the tests often fail to reject the null. In particular, slow (albeit positive) reversion
of real exchange rates toward PPP yields unit root tests that provide little informa-
tion against relevant alternative hypotheses (Froot and Rogoff, 1995). The typically
large estimated confidence intervals around the point estimate of α make it clear that
the level of uncertainty about the value of the “true” α is very high. Nevertheless,
practitioners often use hypothesis tests as a formal model-selection rule.
Andrews (1993) offers a solution to this impasse by introducing a statistical
procedure whereby the probability of selecting the “true” model is at least as large
as the probability of selecting the false model. Unbiased model-selection procedures
have an impartiality property that may be useful if the selection of one model or
another (such as the trend stationary or unit root model) is a contentious issue. In
essence, the issue is to select one of two models defined by α∈Ia and α∈Ib,
where Ia and Ib are intervals partitioning the parameter space (−1, 1] for α, with
Ia = (−1, 1) and Ib = {1} (Andrews, 1993, p. 152).
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commodity prices; by McDermott (1996), Murray and Papell (2002), and Cashin and McDermott (2003)
in modeling the persistence of parity deviations in developed-country real exchange rates; and by Cashin,
McDermott, and Pattillo (2004) in examining the persistence of terms of trade shocks.
5See Cashin and McDermott (2003) for details on the downward bias of autoregressive parameters
derived from least squares estimates of AR models and Andrews’ (1993) method for bias-correcting the
least squares estimator.PARITY REVERSION IN REAL EXCHANGE RATES: FAST,SLOW,OR NOT AT ALL?
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Calculating Half-Lives
The main objective of using the autoregressive model is to extract the degree of
persistence inherent in real exchange rates. Specifically, we use the half-life of
shocks implied by such models to measure persistence. The half-life is defined as
the duration of time it takes for a unit impulse to dissipate permanently by one half
from the occurrence of the initial shock (Cheung and Lai, 2000b). That is, the half-
life (denoted by lh) is given by IR(lh) ≤ 1⁄2 such that lh+k < 1⁄2 for k = 1, 2, ...,   where
the impulse-response function is given by IR(h) = f11(h) for h = 0, 1, 2, ...,  a n d
f11(h) denotes the (1,1) element of Fh, where F is the (p × p) matrix
and
We could also construct two-sided 90 percent (or one-sided 95 percent) con-
fidence intervals for the half-life estimates, as in Cashin, Liang, and McDermott
(2000); Cheung and Lai (2000b); and Murray and Papell (2002). Because such
intervals are typically very wide, the null hypothesis that the half-life is permanent
is rarely rejected. Such a finding leaves us in the awkward position of having to pro-
visionally accept that PPP does not hold or resigning ourselves to the fact that we
cannot make a decision at all because the degree of uncertainty attached to the esti-
mate of the half-life is too high. Murray and Papell (2002) favor the latter option.
However, empirical researchers will typically (for better or worse) make a
judgment as to whether the model is acceptable or not. Failure to reject the null of
a unit root often invokes the argument that the test was not powerful enough, and
researchers then proceed as if the null is false. This approach seems unsatisfactory
and is one that will often deliver different conclusions from different researchers,
because each is now using an arbitrary decision rule—an undisclosed and implicit
decision rule at that. Instead, a more natural procedure is to use the unbiased
model-selection rule of Andrews (1993), which offers an objective means to deter-
mine which model best represents the data. Moreover, because the rule is clear and
explicit, different researchers can use it to verify results in an objective manner. Use
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means that we have used a 0.5 (unbiased) test of the null hypothesis of a finite
half-life versus the alternative hypothesis of a permanent half-life (see Cashin and
McDermott, 2003).
There are other methods we could have used to examine the cross-country expe-
riences of the persistence of parity deviations. One approach is to use long-span time
series to analyze the persistence of real exchange rates. However, this approach is
clouded by the differing nominal exchange rate regimes used by any given country
over time. In order to provide a useful test of the validity of the notion of purchas-
ing power parity in the post–Bretton Woods period, a test needs to be derived using
data specifically from that period. Another approach would be to use multivariate
generalizations of unit root tests of the real exchange rate (through panel unit root
analyses of long-run PPP). This approach also has substantial problems. In particu-
lar, the use of panel unit root tests has been criticized because authors have typically
presumed that rejection of the joint null hypothesis of unit root (nonreversion)
behavior of the whole panel of real exchange rates implies that all real exchange
rates are stationary. In actuality, rejection of the null only implies that at least one
of the real exchange rates is stationary (or mean-reverting). A third approach would
be to use nonlinear methods, as Taylor and Sarno (1998) do. In some sense, this
approach complements the approach used in this paper.
II. Data
In this and the following section, we will investigate the properties of real exchange
rate persistence. The data used to estimate the near unit root model are monthly
time series of the real exchange rate obtained from the International Monetary
Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) from the third quarter of 1973 to
the third quarter of 2002 (the post–Bretton Woods period), which gives a total of
348 observations (see Appendix I for additional details). Appendix I also lists the
derivation and description of the variables used in Section IV to explain the cross-
country heterogeneity of the duration of real exchange rate shocks. The definition
of the real exchange rate is the real effective exchange rate (REER) based on con-
sumer prices (line rec), for which 20 industrial and 70 developing countries were
selected.6
The REER data for six representative countries are set out in Figure 1—an
increase in the REER series indicates a real appreciation of the country’s currency.7
The data reveal that most countries have real exchange rates that exhibit drift or
nonstationarity—that is, there are periods of sustained deviation from PPP. The
evolution of REER appears to be a highly persistent process; for most countries,
the REER does not appear to converge to any particular equilibrium value, with
the possible exception of Sweden. Also, sharp movements in the REER during the
6For a detailed explanation and critique of how the Fund’s REER indices are constructed, see Wickham
(1993) and Zanello and Desruelle (1997).
7The 20 industrial countries and 70 developing countries are listed in Table 1. A decline (depreciation)
in a country’s REER index indicates a rise in its international competitiveness (defined as the relative price
of domestic tradable goods in terms of foreign tradables).PARITY REVERSION IN REAL EXCHANGE RATES: FAST,SLOW,OR NOT AT ALL?
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1980s and 1990s are a relatively frequent occurrence, especially for developing
countries, such as Indonesia, Nigeria, and Mexico.
III. Empirical Results
In this section, we present our estimates of the persistence of parity deviations. We
then examine the cross-country heterogeneity of the persistence results by grouping
the countries using several key characteristics, such as income level, type of nomi-
nal exchange rate regime, type of dominant exportable, and geographic location.
Figure 1. Real Effective Exchange Rate, Selected Countries,
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Biased Least Squares Estimates of Half-Lives of Parity Reversion
The results for the half-life of the duration of shocks to the REER, calculated from
the least squares estimates of α in ADF regression of equation (1), are set out in
Table 1. Across all countries, the average (median) half-life of parity reversion is
4.04 years. This result is consistent with Rogoff’s (1996) consensus of half-lives
of parity reversion of between 36 and 60 months (three to five years), and with
Cheung and Lai’s (2000b) finding of median half-lives of 3.3 years for industrial
countries in the post–Bretton Woods period.
Median-Unbiased Estimates of Half-Lives of Parity Reversion
The half-lives of PPP deviations calculated above (using the least squares estima-
tor) are reasonably close to past studies but are likely to be biased downward and
in favor of finding that PPP holds in the REER data. Consequently, we remove this
bias by calculating median-unbiased estimates for the autoregressive parameter in
equation (1).
The median-unbiased estimates of half-lives derived from the AR parameter
in ADF regressions are reported in Table 1. In comparison with their least squares
counterparts, they are typically much longer, ranging from as little as one month
(Bolivia) to infinity (Belgium and Sweden, among others). Across all countries,
the average (median) half-life of parity reversion is 8.17 years, in excess of the
average least squares AR(p) half-life of 4.04 years.8 This implies a rate of parity
reversion of only 8 percent a year, rather than the 16 percent a year calculated
using least squares.
Using the Andrews unbiased model-selection rule, we find that 50 of the coun-
tries are subject to finitely persistent shocks to their REER (which is consistent with
the reversion of REER to parity), whereas 40 of the countries experience perma-
nent shocks to their REER series. The interpretation of this rule is that for any given
country, there is a 50 percent probability that the interval from zero to the esti-
mated median-unbiased half-life contains the true half-life. There is also a 50 per-
cent probability that the interval from the estimated median-unbiased half-life to
infinity contains the true half-life. Let us take the examples of Iceland (short-lived
half-life) and Togo (infinite half-life). For Iceland, while there is a 50 percent
probability that the interval from zero to 1.1 years contains the true half-life, there
is also a 50 percent probability that the interval from 1.1 years to infinity contains
the true half-life. For Togo, while there is a 50 percent probability that the interval
with a finite upper bound contains the true half-life, there is a 50 percent proba-
bility that the true half-life will be infinite (Table 1). Using the Andrews (1993)
unbiased model-selection rule, the finite (Iceland) and infinite (Togo) estimates of
the half-lives indicate that while shocks to Iceland’s REER are transitory, shocks to
Togo’s REER are best viewed as being permanent.
8In calculating group and all-country median half-lives of deviation from parity, a permanent devia-
tion is defined as one that is at least as long as the span of the data. In our sample, the data span 29 years,
so permanent deviation from parity (infinite shock) is set to equal 30 years.PARITY REVERSION IN REAL EXCHANGE RATES: FAST,SLOW,OR NOT AT ALL?
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Table 1. Half-Lives of Reversion to Parity (years), Real Effective Exchange
Rates, March 1973–March 2002, Advanced and Developing Countries
Biased Unbiased Time to Time to
Country Half-Life Half-Life Peak Unity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ADVANCED COUNTRIES
Belgium 7.00 ∞ 3.00 ∞
Sweden 5.83 ∞ 0.33 ∞
Portugal 4.92 8.42 0.92 3.17
Austria 3.92 8.25 0.83 3.25
Italy 3.67 8.17 1.00 3.17
Spain 3.58 8.17 0.75 3.25
Australia 3.67 8.00 0.08 0.67
Canada 5.42 8.00 1.25 4.50
Japan 5.00 8.00 1.00 4.17
United States 4.25 7.83 1.00 4.58
Ireland 2.75 7.50 0.25 0.83
Finland 3.75 5.50 1.33 3.50
Germany 3.25 5.50 0.83 2.50
Netherlands 3.42 5.50 0.83 2.58
United Kingdom 3.25 5.42 0.33 2.25
Korea, Rep. of 2.08 3.17 0.17 0.83
Switzerland 1.75 2.67 0.08 0.92
Norway 1.83 2.50 0.08 0.33
New Zealand 1.75 1.83 0.08 0.92
Iceland 1.00 1.08 0.08 0.08
Advanced countries median 3.63 7.67 0.79
AFRICA
Burkina Faso 5.58 ∞ 0.08 NCU
Chad 10.92 ∞ 17.58 ∞
Central African Republic 11.75 ∞ 0.08 NCU
Gabon 14.17 ∞ 3.67 ∞
Lesotho ∞∞ 1.42 ∞
Madagascar 8.33 ∞ 0.17 NCU
Mauritania ∞∞ 0.33 NCU
Mauritius 4.17 ∞ 0.17 NS
Morocco 9.67 ∞ 0.17 NS
Senegal 8.17 ∞ 0.50 NCU
Togo 6.42 ∞ 0.08 NCU
Tunisia 10.67 ∞ 2.08 ∞
Niger ∞∞ 0.08 NCU
Gambia, The 1.17 ∞ 0.25 NCU
Ethiopia 4.83 ∞ 0.83 ∞
Tanzania 6.33 14.17 1.17 8.42
Cameroon 3.08 7.25 0.25 S
Seychelles 2.67 6.83 0.17 0.25
Nigeria 4.25 5.58 1.50 3.83
Congo, Rep. of 1.42 4.83 0.08 S
Kenya 2.00 4.33 0.08 0.25
Sierra Leone 1.00 4.33 0.08 0.25Paul Cashin and C.John McDermott
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Table 1 (continued)
Biased Unbiased Time to Time to
Country Half-Life Half-Life Peak Unity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Côte d’ Ivoire 2.17 3.25 0.25 S
Malawi 2.25 3.17 0.08 0.75
Ghana 1.75 2.75 0.08 0.17
Zambia 0.67 1.50 0.08 0.08
Uganda 1.00 1.25 0.08 S
Rwanda 0.50 1.17 0.08 0.17
Sudan 0.92 1.00 0.33 0.42
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 0.42 0.42 0.08 S
Africa median 4.21 22.08 0.17
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Colombia 8.00 ∞ 3.25 ∞
Dominican Republic 5.25 ∞ 0.58 NS
Ecuador 6.33 ∞ 0.92 ∞
El Salvador ∞∞ 0.75 ∞
Guatemala 5.42 ∞ 0.50 ∞
Haiti 19.33 ∞ 0.08 NS
Honduras 5.17 ∞ 0.67 ∞
Paraguay 4.50 ∞ 0.17 NS
Venezuela 6.25 ∞ 0.17 ∞
Panama 10.08 ∞ 0.08 NCU
Peru 1.00 ∞ 0.17 0.33
Guyana 12.50 ∞∞ ∞
Jamaica 4.42 8.33 1.25 3.50
Trinidad and Tobago 3.92 7.75 1.00 4.17
Uruguay 3.25 7.25 0.08 0.33
Costa Rica 3.08 3.83 0.83 1.33
Argentina 2.75 3.58 0.75 2.08
Barbados 2.58 3.50 0.17 0.92
Chile 2.50 2.75 0.92 1.17
Brazil 1.75 2.50 0.08 0.42
Mexico 1.75 1.92 0.50 0.50
Bolivia 0.08 0.08 0.08 S
Western Hemisphere median 4.46 ∞ 0.54
ASIA, MIDDLE EAST, AND EUROPE
Fiji 4.75 ∞ 0.08 NCU
Hungary ∞∞ 1.83 ∞
India 17.67 ∞ 16.75 ∞
Indonesia 11.92 ∞ 0.75 NS
Malaysia 8.25 ∞ 0.33 ∞
Malta 7.08 ∞ 20.00 ∞
Myanmar ∞∞ ∞ ∞
Pakistan ∞∞ 2.00 ∞
Papua New Guinea 1.83 ∞ 0.08 NCU
Thailand 6.17 ∞ 0.17 NS
Nepal 9.33 ∞ 0.17 NCUPARITY REVERSION IN REAL EXCHANGE RATES: FAST,SLOW,OR NOT AT ALL?
99
We conclude that the majority of countries in our sample have real exchange
rates that revert (albeit sometimes slowly) to PPP and, thus, that PPP holds in the
post–Bretton Woods period. Our conclusion differs from that of some previous
authors, because we use an unbiased model-selection rule that has a probability of
correctly selecting the unit root model (when the true α=1) of about 0.5. This con-
trasts with the Monte Carlo experiments of Sarno and Taylor (2002), who show that
standard method yields a probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root
in the real exchange rate (when the rate is, in fact, mean-reverting) of only 0.11.
Impulse Response Functions and Half-Lives of Shocks to Parity
Figure 2 sets out the impulse-response functions (IRFs) for three country pairs:
Sweden and Indonesia (which exhibit permanent shocks to their real exchange
rate), the United States and Nigeria (which exhibit hump-shaped IRFs with finite
half-lives), and the United Kingdom and Mexico (which exhibit monotonic decay
to real exchange rate shocks and finite half-lives). The half-life can be read from
the intersection of the relevant IRF with the line indicating persistence of 0.5. The
Table 1 (concluded)
Biased Unbiased Time to Time to
Country Half-Life Half-Life Peak Unity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Philippines 3.50 8.08 0.42 2.17
Syrian Arab Republic 4.42 7.92 0.75 3.25
Samoa 3.33 7.83 0.92 S
Turkey 1.92 5.67 0.08 0.17
Iran, Islamic Republic of 3.08 5.42 0.67 0.92
Sri Lanka 2.50 5.17 0.17 1.50
Egypt 2.00 2.42 0.42 0.25
Asia, Middle East, and 5.46 ∞ 0.54
Europe median
All countries median 4.04 8.17 0.33
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Column (2): Biased half-life of parity deviation, based on least squares estimation of the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller regression of equation (1). The half-life for AR(p) models is calculated
from the impulse-response functions (IRF) and is defined as the time taken for a unit impulse to
dissipate permanently by one-half from the occurrence of the initial shock. Column (3): Median-
unbiased half-life of parity deviation, based on median-unbiased estimation of the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller regression of equation (1), as given by Andrews and Chen (1994). The half-life is as described
for column (2) above. Column (4): “Time to peak” is the number of months following the unit shock
to the real exchange rate that the IRF reaches its peak. Column (5): “Time to unity” is the number of
months following the unit shock to the real exchange rate that the IRF crosses unity. NCU denotes non-
stationary series—the IRF never crosses unity. NS denotes nonstationary series—the IRF is above
unity, then crosses unity but does not decay. The symbol ∞ denotes classic nonstationary series—the
IRF rises above unity and stays there. S denotes stationary series—the IRF never rises above unity
and has a monotonic decay. In calculating group and all-country medians, infinity (∞) is set to equal
30 years.Paul Cashin and C.John McDermott
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impact of high-frequency noise can be seen in the first few lags of the hump-
shaped IRFs of the United States and Nigeria. The hump-shaped IRFs indicate that
real exchange rate shocks are initially magnified. In both cases, the magnification
of the real exchange rate shock can last up to one and a half years, with the IRF
taking about four years to return to unity.9 As pointed out by Cheung and Lai













































































































































































































































































































Figure 2. Impulse-Response Function (IRF) of a Shock to the Real Effective
Exchange Rate, Selected Countries, 1973:3–2002:3
9Following Cheung and Lai (2000b), the effects of nonmonotonic reversion to parity can also be illus-
trated by calculating the half-life of real exchange rate shocks after the period of initial magnification. For
both the United States and Nigeria, these modified half-life estimates are much shorter than the standard
half-life of parity reversion, indicating that once the initial magnification period is completed, the IRFs dis-
sipate rather rapidly. The duration of postmagnification half-lives can be calculated from Table 1 as the dif-
ference between the unbiased half-life (column 3) and the time to peak (column 4).PARITY REVERSION IN REAL EXCHANGE RATES: FAST,SLOW,OR NOT AT ALL?
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nificant extension of the process of parity reversion (shock dissipation). Clearly, it
is important to control for this kind of serial correlation in real exchange rates;
while the AR(p) regressions can do so, standard AR(1) regressions assume that
shocks decay monotonically and so would drastically underestimate the half-life
of real exchange rate shocks.
There may be biases that offset the mean bias emanating from least squares
estimation of shock persistence. Taylor (2001) contends there are two sources of
upward bias in the estimation of the duration of exchange rate deviations from par-
ity. The first is temporal aggregation bias, in which the use of low-frequency data
does not allow the identification of high-frequency adjustment processes. The sec-
ond is the linear AR(1) specification of unit root models, which assume monotonic
reversion to parity. The use of monthly data should reduce the risk of temporal
aggregation bias, while the use of an AR(p) model should remove the source of the
second bias (see Cashin and McDermott, 2003).10
Imbs and others (2005) argue that the PPP puzzle is largely an artifact of
aggregation across sectors, whereby sectoral heterogeneity in the duration of devi-
ations from the law of one price can induce an upward bias in the speed of parity
reversion of the real exchange rate derived using aggregate price indices. The Imbs
and others (2005) result is to some extent controversial (see Chen and Engel,
2004), but sectoral aggregation could be a source of upward bias in the half-lives
derived from both conventional and median-unbiased estimates of AR models.
In addition, the use of real effective (rather than bilateral) exchange rate data
imparts another potential aggregation bias at the international level, since trade-
weighted price levels are used in the calculation of a country’s overall effective
exchange rate. Such international aggregation could also be a source of upward bias
to the estimated speed of parity reversion. However, previous work has found that
the persistence properties of shocks to the real effective and bilateral exchange rate
series are very similar (see McDermott, 1996).
Finally, Chen and Rogoff (2003) and Cashin, Céspedes, and Sahay (2004) point
out that there are important real factors (such as real commodity export prices) that
might be expected to affect the equilibrium real exchange rate of both advanced
and developing countries. Both studies find that the half-life of the reversion of the
real exchange rate to its (constant) long-run average level is much longer than the
half-life of the reversion of the real exchange rate to its (time-varying) long-run
equilibrium with real commodity prices. In this view, the long-run reversion of
real exchange rates to purchasing power parity is a first approximation only (see
Taylor, 2003).
Cross-Country Heterogeneity of Half-Lives of Real Exchange 
Rate Shocks
The results of our estimation of the median-unbiased half-life of reversion to PPP
are shown in the histograms of Figures 3A to 3D. In our sample of 90 countries,
10The next step in the research agenda attempting to solve the PPP puzzle could lie in the development
and implementation of median-unbiased nonlinear estimators of the speed of parity reversion.Paul Cashin and C.John McDermott
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there are 50 countries for which the half-life estimates range from 1 to 14 years,
and 40 countries that experience permanent real exchange rate shocks (half-lives
of 29 years or more). Examining industrial countries alone, the average (median)
half-life is about eight years, which is twice as long as the downward-biased esti-
mates of previous studies (Rogoff, 1996; and Cheung and Lai, 2000a).11 In con-
trast, the half-life estimates for developing countries appear to be evenly spread,
with most of the estimated deviations from parity being permanent. Accordingly,
median-unbiased estimates of half-lives tend to be much longer for developing
countries than for industrial countries. This finding of relatively slower parity rever-
sion for developing countries contradicts the results of Cheung and Lai (2000a).
However, it is consistent with Froot and Rogoff (1995), who expected that the rapid
economic growth often associated with low-income countries would induce such
drastic changes in the relative price of tradables and nontradables that the likeli-
hood of parity reversion holding in any given country would rise with the level of
income. Finally, the hypothesis that the real exchange rate is mean-reverting in
developing countries receives some support—for 32 of 70 developing countries,
the half-life of parity reversion is finite (Table 1). In contrast, the hypothesis of mean
reversion of real exchange rates for developed countries receives much stronger
support: 18 of 20 developed countries have real exchange rates that typically expe-
rience finite shocks.
When countries are classified by their dominant exportable, the half-life esti-
mates for (nonfuel) primary commodity exporters appear rather dispersed (Figure
3A). This is consistent with earlier findings on the heterogeneous persistence of
terms of trade shocks affecting African commodity-exporting countries (see Cashin,
McDermott, and Pattillo, 2004). The average half-life for nonfuel primary-product
exporters is found to be about 22 years; while finite, this implies only a very slow
speed of parity reversion.
The regional grouping of developing countries reveals that shock persistence of
African and Western Hemisphere countries is evenly spread between finite and per-
manent shocks; in contrast, permanent shocks dominate in Asian countries (Figures
3A and 3B). The existing literature on parity reversion in developing countries has
a sample-selection problem, as it has typically concentrated on analyses of high-
inflation Latin American countries. Consistent with that literature, we find that
parity deviations in the often-studied countries of the Western Hemisphere (espe-
cially Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Argentina) are rather short-lived (all with half-
lives of less than four years). Not surprisingly, the parity reversion half-lives for
heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs), which are mostly African, resemble the
African results—the average half-life for HIPCs is found to be about 11 years.
Net debtor developing countries have also been grouped by source of external
financing—for both private external financing and official external financing, real
exchange rate shocks are typically permanent. Country groups of different income
levels also exhibit a systematic pattern of differences in the persistence of real
11This result is also consistent with the median-unbiased half-lives calculated for industrial countries
by Cashin and McDermott (2003).PARITY REVERSION IN REAL EXCHANGE RATES: FAST,SLOW,OR NOT AT ALL?
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exchange rate shocks (Figure 3C)—our results tend to confirm previous work,
finding an inverse relationship between income level and shock persistence (see
Cheung and Lai, 2000a).
We also examine the persistence of parity deviations after classifying coun-
tries by type of nominal exchange rate regime. We classify country real exchange
Figure 3A. Frequency Distribution of Median-Unbiased Half-Lives of
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rates by type of nominal exchange rate regime, using (1) the IMF’s (1998) de jure
classification, which is based on the publicly stated commitment of the authori-
ties of the country in question; and (2) the de facto classification of Reinhart and
Rogoff (2002), which is based on the observed behavior of market-determined real
exchange rates, including that of active parallel exchange rate markets. It is impor-
tant to examine both de facto and de jure exchange rates because, through exchange
Figure 3B. Frequency Distribution of Median-Unbiased Half-Lives of Deviations
from Purchasing Power Parity, Country Groups, 1973–2002
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Figure 3C. Frequency Distribution of Median-Unbiased Half-Lives of Deviations
from Purchasing Power Parity, Country Groups, 1973–2002
(m) Countries with Annual Income 
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market intervention or monetary policy, the authorities of a country can transform
a de jure flexible exchange rate regime into a de facto pegged regime. Similarly,
active parallel markets can transform de jure pegged official exchange rates into
de facto flexible regimes.
When all 90 countries are categorized by the IMF’s (1998) de jure exchange rate
classification rules, it is clear that pegged exchange rate countries typically experi-
ence permanent deviations from parity, while more flexible exchange rate countries
have much more dispersed half-lives of deviations from parity (Figure 3D). Very
similar results are derived when exchange rates are classified using the Reinhart and
Rogoff (2002) de facto exchange rate classification. The de facto classification
reveals that while permanent real exchange rate shocks dominate the experience of
pegged exchange rate countries, parity deviations for the majority of flexible
exchange rate countries are finite and typically range between 2 and 10 years.
IV. What Is Causing the Heterogeneous Persistence 
of Deviations from Parity?
Underpinning the fundamental idea of long-run PPP is the notion that arbitrage in
goods ensures that the parity condition is satisfied across a range of goods over a
certain period. A key question is what might be causing the heterogeneous duration
of exchange rate deviations from parity. In particular, in this section we will inves-
tigate the differences in the speed of parity reversion among advanced (industrial)
and developing countries, and among countries with fixed and flexible nominal
exchange rate regimes. Following Cheung and Lai (2000a), we examine whether
the observed pattern of the persistence of real exchange rate shocks can be linked
to any systematic differences in structural characteristics across countries.
Given that the usual distributional assumption of normality is not likely to
hold for the distribution of either the half-lives of deviations from parity or the
structural characteristics of countries, we use several nonparametric tests to exam-
ine the statistical significance of various hypotheses. These tests concern the equal-
ity of the average duration of parity deviations across country groups; the equality
of the variability of the average duration of parity deviations across country groups;
and whether the pattern of persistence of parity deviations is correlated with coun-
tries’ structural characteristics.
First, we implement a nonparametric test of the equality of the median half-life
of deviations from parity across country groups (the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test).
The results (listed in column 4 of Table 2) indicate that the null hypothesis of equal
median half-lives is rejected, at the 5 percent significance level, for advanced ver-
sus developing countries. Further, the null hypothesis of equal median half-lives is
rejected, at the 5 percent significance level, for pegged versus flexible exchange
rate countries (classified under either the IMF (1998) or Reinhart and Rogoff
(2002) classification scheme). Accordingly, we conclude that the average half-life
of real exchange rate deviations from parity for advanced (industrial) countries 
is shorter in duration than the average for developing countries. In addition, the
average half-life for countries with pegged nominal exchange rates is significantly
longer in duration than that for countries with flexible nominal exchange rates.PARITY REVERSION IN REAL EXCHANGE RATES: FAST,SLOW,OR NOT AT ALL?
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When examining the persistence of real exchange rate shocks, the statistical sig-
nificance of the difference of the group medians confirms the pattern shown in
Figures 3A–3D—industrial countries display less persistence than developing
Figure 3D. Frequency Distribution of Median-Unbiased Half-Lives of
Deviations from Purchasing Power Parity, Country Groups, 1973–2002
(s) IMF AREAER (dejure): Pegged
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countries, and countries with fixed nominal exchange rate regimes display more
persistence than countries with flexible nominal exchange rate regimes.
Second, we examine whether the differences in the sample variances of the
half-lives across country groups are statistically significant by implementing the
Brown-Forsythe test. The results (listed in column 5 of Table 2) indicate that the null
hypothesis of equal variances of the half-lives is rejected, at the 5 percent signifi-
cance level, for the industrial countries in comparison with the developing countries.
Interestingly, the null of equality of the variances of the half-lives across pegged
and flexible exchange rate regimes cannot be rejected. Accordingly, there is evi-
dence that the duration of half-lives of parity deviations for developing countries
is more variable than the duration of half-lives of parity deviations for industrial
countries.
Third, we use our cross-country data to examine whether each country’s per-
sistence of deviations from parity is correlated with its structural characteristics.
As normality is unlikely to hold here, we again use a nonparametric test—the
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Persistence of 
PPP Deviations, Country Groups
H0: Equality H0: Equality
Average Number of of Median of Variance  of
Persistence of Observations  Deviation from Deviation from
Deviations from per Country PPP ( p-value) PPP ( p-value)
Country Group PPP (years) Group WMW test BF test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All countries 8.17 90
Advanced 7.67 20








Free-floating/falling 5.58 12 3.22 (0.001) 0.67 (0.418)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Column (1): Country group; for definition and derivation, see Appendix II. Column (2):
Persistence of deviations from PPP is calculated as the group average (median) half-life (in years) of
deviations of the real exchange rate from parity. Column (3): Number of observations is the number of
countries in each country group. Column (4): WMW is the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test statistic of the
null hypothesis of equality of the median half-life of deviations from PPP for each country group; the
p-value is for the asymptotic normal approximation to the Wilcoxon t-statistic (see Conover, 1999).
Column (5): BF is the Brown-Forsythe test statistic of the null hypothesis of equality of the variance of
the median half-life of deviations from PPP for each country group. The F-statistic for the BF test has
an approximate F-distribution with G = 1 numerator degrees of freedom and N–G denominator degrees
of freedom, under the null of equal variances in each group, where G is the number of groups and N the
number of observations; the approximate p-value is given in parentheses.PARITY REVERSION IN REAL EXCHANGE RATES: FAST,SLOW,OR NOT AT ALL?
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Spearman rank correlation test (see Cheung and Lai (2000a) and Conover (1999)
for details). The Spearman rank correlation test measures whether there is a sig-
nificant relationship between the persistence of parity deviations and key struc-
tural characteristics (such as cross-country differentials in inflation and trade
openness). The null hypothesis of the Spearman rank correlation test is that there
is no rank correlation between the persistence of parity deviations and differentials
in each country’s structural characteristics. In explaining empirical cross-country
heterogeneity in the duration of real exchange rate deviations from parity, we will
evaluate several fundamental characteristics (see Appendix I for details), includ-
ing cross-country differentials in inflation (INF), nominal exchange rate arrange-
ments (VOFFER and VPARER), openness to trade (TGDP), productivity growth
(PCGDP), and the share of government spending in the economy (GGDP).
Inflation
If national price movements were dominated by nominal (monetary) shocks, then
parity reversion would be expected to be rather fast. Given the presence of nominal
rigidities, a higher inflation rate may bring about more frequent adjustment of
goods prices and shrink the duration of deviations from parity. Indeed, previous
work has indicated that PPP typically holds for high-inflation countries (Frenkel,
1978; and McNown and Wallace, 1989). To analyze whether relative inflation is
related to cross-country differences in persistence of parity deviations, we construct
the average (median) inflation rate over the sample period (INF) for each country.
The rank correlation coefficient between the half-life of the real exchange rate and
the rate of inflation is −0.281, with an approximate p-value of 0.007 (Table 3).
Using the critical values of Zar (1972), the null of no rank correlation is decisively
rejected, with the rank correlation being negative and statistically significant at the
1 percent level. This indicates that, across advanced and developing countries, there
is an inverse relationship between inflation and the persistence of real exchange rate
shocks. That is, countries with higher inflation rates tend to have shorter lived devi-
ations of their real exchange rates from PPP, which suggests that parity reversion is
fast when price movements largely reflect monetary shocks.
Nominal Exchange Rate Volatility
Mussa (1986) stressed that exchange rates behaved differently under alternative
exchange rate regimes, finding that the post–Bretton Woods float of major curren-
cies had induced large real exchange rate variability in many industrial countries.
Greater flexibility in nominal exchange rates would be expected to increase the
speed of parity reversion of real exchange rates by encouraging more frequent
adjustment of goods prices. However, as noted above, it is important to measure
the variability of nominal exchange rates using both the official exchange rate
(VOFFER) and the exchange rate determined in parallel markets (VPARER). In
doing so, we use both the official and parallel exchange rate market data of Reinhart
and Rogoff (2002) for the period 1973–98, with variability measured as the standard
deviation of the (monthly) rate of change of the (log) series.Paul Cashin and C.John McDermott
110
The rank correlation coefficient between the half-life of the real exchange rate
and the variability of the official nominal exchange rate is −0.379, with an approx-
imate p-value of 0.002 (Table 3). Similarly, the rank correlation coefficient between
the half-life of the real exchange rate and the variability of the parallel-market nom-
inal exchange rate is −0.282, with an approximate p-value of 0.02. Both correla-
tions are negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This indicates
that, across advanced and developing countries, there is an inverse relationship
between nominal exchange rate variability and the persistence of real exchange
rate shocks; that is, countries with more variable nominal exchange rates tend to
have shorter lived deviations of their real exchange rates from PPP. These results
are broadly consistent with the conclusions of Goldfajn and Valdés (1999), who
find that overvaluation of real exchange rates was typically corrected by changes
in the nominal exchange rate rather than changes in inflation differentials.
Productivity Growth and Government Spending
Productivity growth is a supply-side factor that can affect the persistence of real
exchange rate shocks. The Balassa-Samuelson effect has traditionally been the
most popular explanation for the persistence of parity deviations. The Balassa-
Samuelson hypothesis highlights the potential effects of differential productivity
growth (favoring the traded goods sector) on the behavior of real exchange rates,
which ultimately raises the relative price of nontraded goods. Importantly, this
Table 3. Rank Correlation of Half-Life of Deviation from Purchasing Power
Parity with Country Characteristics, All Countries
Rank Correlation Approximate
of Characteristic p-Value
with Half-Life of (number of
Country Characteristic Parity Deviations observations)
(1) (2) (3)
Rate of inflation −0.281* 0.007 (90)
Volatility of the official nominal exchange rate −0.379* 0.002 (70)
Volatility of the parallel-market nominal exchange rate −0.282* 0.02 (70)
Productivity growth −0.038 0.77 (90)
Government spending −0.073 0.50 (88)
Trade openness 0.180 0.10 (89)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Column (1): Country characteristic; for definition and derivation, see Appendix I. Column
(2): Spearman rank correlation coefficient—the null hypothesis of the Spearman test is that there is
no correlation between the (tie-adjusted) rank of each country’s bias-corrected half-life of parity devi-
ation and the rank of its period-average value of the country characteristic. Persistence of deviations
from PPP is calculated as the median-unbiased half-life (in years) of real exchange rate deviations
from parity (listed in column 3 of Table 1). Column (3): The approximate p-value is taken from Zar
(1972). An asterisk (*) denotes that the null hypothesis of no rank correlation is rejected at the 5 per-
cent level of significance. The number of country observations is given in parentheses.PARITY REVERSION IN REAL EXCHANGE RATES: FAST,SLOW,OR NOT AT ALL?
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traded-goods productivity bias is deemed to rise with the wealth of the country.
Following Balassa (1964), we proxy for productivity growth by using the rate of
growth of per capita real GDP; accordingly, we construct the average (median) per
capita growth rate over the sample period for each country (PCGDP).
In the presence of capital and labor that are mobile across sectors in the long
run but not the short run, government spending is a demand-side factor that is also
hypothesized to affect the speed of parity reversion by producing a stronger home-
goods bias. Froot and Rogoff (1991) note that government spending typically falls
more heavily on nontraded goods, thereby bidding up their price relative to the
price of tradables. Bergin and Feenstra (2001) suggest that real exchange rate per-
sistence rises with the share of produced goods that are nontraded. Accordingly,
we construct the average (median) for government spending as a share of GDP
over the sample period for each country (GGDP).
The rank correlation coefficient between the half-life of the real exchange rate
and the growth of per capita GDP is −0.038, with an approximate p-value of 0.77
(Table 3). Similarly, the rank correlation coefficient between the half-life of the
real exchange rate and government spending as a share of GDP is −0.073, with an
approximate p-value of 0.50. Neither rank correlation is significantly different
from zero. We thus conclude that there is little evidence that either higher produc-
tivity growth or greater government spending can explain much of the observed
pattern of deviation from PPP across countries. Our conclusions are consistent
with those of Rogoff (1996).
Trade Openness
Rogoff, Froot, and Kim (2001) highlight the effect of goods market arbitrage,
which, if operative, can accelerate the speed of parity reversion across goods.
Greater trade flows should, in principle, promote goods market arbitrage, encour-
age more frequent price adjustment by firms, and reduce the persistence of real
exchange rate shocks (Faruqee, 1995). As a measure of trade openness, we con-
struct for each country over the sample period the average (median) ratio of exports
plus imports to GDP (TGDP). The rank correlation coefficient between the half-
life of the real exchange rate and external trade as a share of GDP is 0.180, with
an approximate p-value of 0.10 (Table 3). This rank correlation differs insignifi-
cantly from zero. Accordingly, there is little evidence in favor of the goods arbitrage
view of PPP—differences in trade openness are not associated with the persistence
of parity deviations across countries.12
To summarize, we find that cross-country differences in inflation rates and nom-
inal exchange rate variability have a strong and statistically significant inverse rela-
tionship with the observed pattern of the persistence of deviations from purchasing
12Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2001) also find a nonnegative relationship between openness and the per-
sistence of sectoral real exchange rate deviations. They attribute this result to the inverse relationship
between openness and inflation (see Romer, 1993). For our sample of countries, we also find a strong neg-
ative rank correlation between openness and inflation (−0.397). This suggests that greater openness is asso-
ciated with lower inflation, which implies a slower speed of parity reversion.Paul Cashin and C.John McDermott
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power parity.13 Indeed, to the extent that the existing literature on measuring parity
reversion in developing countries has largely concentrated on the Latin American
experience (which is dominated by high-inflation countries), this sample-selection
bias can account for the erroneous received wisdom that parity reversion in devel-
oping countries is faster than that observed for developed countries. However, once
a wider set of developing countries is analyzed, parity reversion in developing
countries is typically slower than that observed for developed countries.
V. Conclusion
The validity of purchasing power parity (PPP)—the notion that prices in different
countries move toward equality in common currency terms—is of interest to pol-
icymakers for two main reasons. First, PPP provides a long-term benchmark for
the equilibrium value of exchange rates and, as such, is a criterion for evaluating
the competitiveness of real exchange rates. Second, PPP has been adopted as a
central building block of many theories of exchange rate determination; the qual-
ity of policy advice based on these theories may depend on the validity of PPP.
This paper has reexamined whether PPP holds during the post–Bretton Woods
period by investigating the time series properties of the real effective exchange
rate of 90 advanced and developing countries. The post-1973 revival of flexible
exchange rates spawned a great interest in the empirical relevance of the PPP 
theory of real exchange rate determination. Previous studies of PPP reversion
largely focused on developed countries, and univariate studies of the hypothesis of
unit roots in real exchange rates yielded consensus estimates of the half-life of
deviations of real exchange rates from PPP of about four years (Rogoff, 1996).
Using least squares estimation of unit root models, we replicate the consensus
finding in the literature. However, using median-unbiased estimation techniques
that remove the downward bias of least squares, we find that the half-lives of par-
ity reversion are much longer than the consensus estimate, with a cross-country
average of bias-corrected half-lives of about eight years. Our results confirm
Rogoff’s (1996) “PPP puzzle”—that while PPP holds for the majority of coun-
tries, the reversion of real exchange rates to parity is, in many cases, rather slow.
Using the median-unbiased estimates of the half-lives of deviations from par-
ity and the Andrews (1993) unbiased model-selection rule, we conclude that 50 of
the 90 countries in our sample have finite half-lives of parity reversion, which indi-
cates that there is a better than even chance that shocks to their real exchange rates
are transitory. For these 50 countries, we can conclude that there is reversion of
real exchange rates to parity and that PPP holds in the post–Bretton Woods period.
Conversely, there is little evidence of parity reversion for the remaining 40 coun-
tries in our sample, where shocks to the real exchange rate are best viewed as
being permanent.
13As a robustness check on the unconditional correlation results, least squares regression of the half-life
of parity deviation on the above-mentioned structural characteristics was also carried out. As in the bivari-
ate correlations, inflation is the most significant variable for reducing the half-life of parity deviations.PARITY REVERSION IN REAL EXCHANGE RATES: FAST,SLOW,OR NOT AT ALL?
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Our analysis yields evidence of significant heterogeneity of parity reversion
across countries and across groups of countries. In our view, the general relevance
of parity reversion has been exaggerated by the predilection of studies to focus on
the reversion experience of developed countries. In addition, the few studies of
parity reversion for developing countries have suffered from sample-selection
bias, in that they typically examined the speed of reversion in high-inflation Latin
American countries. We find that parity reversion is more likely to be found for
developed countries than for developing countries. Parity reversion is also more
likely to be found for countries with flexible nominal exchange rate regimes than
for countries with fixed nominal exchange rate regimes. Finally, when we exam-
ine the determinants of the observed cross-country heterogeneity in the persistence
of reversion of real exchange rates to parity, we find that parity reversion tends to
be faster in high-inflation countries than in low-inflation countries and slower in
countries with less nominal exchange rate variability.
APPENDIX I
Description of the Data
The primary data sources are the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) and Information
Notice System (INS), Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), and the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (2002). Below we provide a description of each series used in the paper. The 90
developing and developed countries in the full sample are listed in Table 1. Unless otherwise
noted, the data are for the sample period 1973–2002.
REER: The real effective exchange rate data are of monthly frequency, for the period March
1973–March 2002; a total of 358 observations. REER is the trade-weighted measure of the sea-
sonally adjusted, CPI-based real effective exchange rate (base 1990=100); obtained from the
IMF’s INS.
INF: The rate of change of consumer prices (percent a year); period average of annual data
1973–2002; obtained from the IMF’s IFS.
GGDP: General government final consumption spending as a share of GDP; period average of
annual data 1973–2002; obtained from World Bank (2002).
PCGDP: Growth of per capita GDP (percent per annum); period average of annual data,
1973–2002; obtained from World Bank (2002).
TGDP: Exports and imports of goods and services (valued in current U.S. dollars) as a share
of GDP (valued in current U.S. dollars); period average of annual data, 1973–2002; obtained
from World Bank (2002).
VPARER: Volatility of the parallel market exchange rate; measured as the standard deviation
of the (monthly) rate of change of the parallel market exchange rate, with the exchange rate
measured as the logarithm of the parallel nominal exchange rate (local currency per U.S. dol-
lar), March 1973 to December 1998; obtained from Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).
VOFFER: Volatility of the official exchange rate; measured as the standard deviation of the
(monthly) rate of change of the official exchange rate, with the exchange rate measured as the
logarithm of the official nominal exchange rate (local currency per U.S. dollar), March 1973 to
December 1998; obtained from Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).Paul Cashin and C.John McDermott
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Nominal Exchange Rate Regime
The IMF’s de jure classification, used between 1975 and 1997 in its Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), consisted of 10 categories grouped as
follows: regimes 1–5 are defined as fixed pegs; regimes 6–7 (limited flexibility with respect to
a single currency, cooperative arrangements) are intermediate; and regimes 8–10 (including
managed floating and independently floating) are flexible arrangements. For each country, the
de jure exchange rate regime classification is the mode of the AREAER classification numbers
over the period 1975–98. See Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) for details.
The Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) de facto classification describes exchange rate regimes as:
(1) de facto pegs (including no separate legal tender and currency boards), denoted as regime 1;
(2) limited flexibility (including crawling pegs and narrow crawling bands), denoted as regime 2;
(3) managed floating (including wider crawling bands), denoted as regime 3; (4) freely float-
ing, denoted as regime 4; and (5) freely falling (where the annualized rate of inflation exceeds
40 percent), denoted as regime 5. For each country, the de facto exchange rate regime classifi-
cation is the mode of the annual Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) classification numbers over the
period 1973–98. The following countries had no Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) classification
data: Barbados, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea,
Rwanda, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Trinidad and Tobago.
APPENDIX II
Country Group Classifications
The 90 developed and developing countries in our sample (listed in Table 1) have been classified
into various country groups in order to undertake cross-country comparisons of the persistence of
parity deviations. The major sources of classification were the IMF’s World Economic Outlook
(2002, 2000); the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(AREAER), various issues; the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (2002);
Andrews and others (1999); and Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). The country groups, along with the
country members and classification rule, follow.
The IMF’s World Economic Outlook (2002) classifies countries into groups on the basis of
certain criteria. For nondeveloping countries, the groups are advanced economies and countries
in transition. Developing countries are classified by their predominant export. Primary product
exporters are those countries whose exports of agricultural and mineral primary products
(Standard Industrial Trade Classification (SITC) 0, 1, 2, 4, 68) accounted for at least 50 percent
of their total export earnings during 1994–98. Fuel exporters are those countries whose exports
of fuel products (SITC 3) accounted for at least 50 percent of their total export earnings during
1994–98. Net debtor countries are defined as developing countries with negative external assets
at the end of 1998. Net debtor countries are then differentiated by their main source of external
financing: Those with official financing (including official grants) accounting for more than
two-thirds of their total 1994–98 external financing are classified as official external financing
countries; and those with private financing (including direct and portfolio investment) account-
ing for more than two-thirds of their total 1994–98 external financing are classified as private
external financing countries.
Advanced economies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States (IMF (2002) classification).
Developing countries:Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic ofPARITY REVERSION IN REAL EXCHANGE RATES: FAST,SLOW,OR NOT AT ALL?
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Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, República Bolivariana de Venezuela, and Zambia
(IMF (2002) classification).
Nonfuel primary-product exporting countries: Australia, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Canada,
Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, The
Gambia, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Myanmar, New
Zealand, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, and Zambia (IMF
(2002) classification).
Fuel-exporting countries: Republic of Congo, Gabon, Islamic Republic of Iran, Nigeria,
Norway, Trinidad and Tobago, and República Bolivariana de Venezuela (IMF (2002) 
classification).
African developing countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, The
Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda,
and Zambia (IMF (2002) classification).
Asian developing countries: Fiji, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan,
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Sri Lanka, and Thailand (IMF (2002) classification).
Western Hemisphere developing countries: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and
República Bolivariana de Venezuela (IMF (2002) classification).
Middle East and Turkey developing countries: Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran, Malta, Syria,
and Turkey (IMF (2002) classification).
Heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs): Comprises those countries (except Nigeria) con-
sidered by the IMF and World Bank for their HIPC debt initiative—Bolivia, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mauritania, Myanmar, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda,
and Zambia (IMF (2002) classification; see Andrews and others, (1999)).
Developing countries—net debtor countries, private external financing: Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Guatemala, India,
Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico,
Morocco, Myanmar, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Thailand, Trinidad and
Tobago, Turkey, and República Bolivariana de Venezuela (IMF (2000) classification).
Developing countries—net debtor countries, official external financing: Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic 
of Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mauritania, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia
(IMF (2000) classification).Paul Cashin and C.John McDermott
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Countries with annual income (real GDP per capita in U.S. dollars in 1995) of $102–$280:
Burkina Faso, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Tanzania (World Bank (2002) 
classification).
Countries with annual income (real GDP per capita in U.S. dollars in 1995) of $281–$769:
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Haiti, Honduras,
India, Kenya, Mauritania, Pakistan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia (World
Bank (2002) classification).
Countries with annual income (real GDP per capita in U.S. dollars in 1995) of
$770–$2,111: Bolivia, Republic of Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Jamaica, Morocco, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Philippines, Syria, and Tunisia (World Bank (2002) classification).
Countries with annual income (real GDP per capita in U.S. dollars in 1995) of
$2,112–$5,792: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Gabon, Hungary, Malaysia, Mauritius,
Mexico, Peru, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uruguay, and República Bolivariana de
Venezuela (World Bank (2002) classification).
Countries with annual income (real GDP per capita in U.S. dollars in 1995) of $5,793–
$15,891: Argentina, Barbados, Korea, Portugal, and Spain (World Bank (2002) classification).
Countries with annual income (real GDP per capita in U.S. dollars in 1995) of
$15,892–$43,600: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and
United States (World Bank (2002) classification).
IMF pegged exchange rate countries: Argentina, Austria, Barbados, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican
Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Hungary, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Myanmar, Niger, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, Seychelles, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand,
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, República Bolivariana de Venezuela, and Zambia (AREAER clas-
sification; see Appendix I).
IMF intermediate exchange rate countries: Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, and
Netherlands (AREAER classification; see Appendix I).
IMF flexible exchange rate countries: Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Ecuador, The Gambia, Ghana, Iceland, India,
Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Madagascar, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda,
United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay (AREAER classification; see Appendix I).
Reinhart and Rogoff pegged exchange rate countries: Austria, Belgium, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon,
Guatemala, Haiti, Kenya, Lesotho, Mexico, Netherlands, Niger, Panama, Senegal, Thailand,
Togo, and República Bolivariana de Venezuela (Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) classification; see
Appendix I).
Reinhart and Rogoff limited flexibility and managed float exchange rate countries:
Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, ThePARITY REVERSION IN REAL EXCHANGE RATES: FAST,SLOW,OR NOT AT ALL?
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Gambia, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran,
Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Korea, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines,
Portugal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, and United
Kingdom (Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) classification; see Appendix I).
Reinhart and Rogoff freely floating/falling exchange rate countries: Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, Republic of Congo, Germany, Ghana, Japan, Peru, Turkey, United States, Uruguay, and
Zambia (Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) classification; see Appendix I).
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